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Approved For Release 2002/06/10 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000500020067-2

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[redacted] 350-42
copy 10 of 10

1 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Director/Special Activities

SUBJECT

EASTMAN KODAK

(Recommended Change in Primary Security Responsibility)

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for your concurrence in paragraph 9.

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2. Your attention is invited to the attached IN cable 30620 in which [redacted] of Eastman Kodak "subtly" expressed his displeasure over an EK man being invited to MPIC by a representative of [redacted] then due to his lack of a "T" clearance he was barred from access.

25X1A

3. The situation referred to by [redacted] certainly emphasized the imperative need for checking with this Security Branch with regard to clearance status before inviting representatives of contractors to participate in conferences in order to insure that the invitees qualify security wise. This is not the first instance of such a situation wherein an operationally cleared (I, C or A) representative of EK has suddenly shown up at a government facility and was barred due to his lack of a "T" clearance. This suggests to me, however, a much broader problem which I recommend we address ourselves to at this time.

4. The EK photographic processing facility is treated as falling within the operational security domain. Although the products of Projects I and C are rigidly protected within the "T" system and all "T" requirements for clearance are being strictly enforced, still I suggest that the "T" people have been closing their eyes to the handling of I and C product material and its control when it serves their purpose. When film is developed by EK, I assert it is, in fact, "T" material and its loss or a security leak regarding its content would be just as sensitive and serious as such a security infraction when the material is at MPIC.

5. I suggest, therefore, that we seriously consider exploring with all interested parties the feasibility of recognizing the true situation and terminating OSA operations security responsibility when the exposed film is delivered to EK and the product (T) security people assume full charge at that time. This would necessitate

a. applying "T" security standards to the appropriate EK processing facility.

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Handle via

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Approved For Release 2002/06/10 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000500020067-2

25X1A

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Page 2

b. debriefing a number (possibly two hundred) processors from operational clearances and clearing them for "T",

c. seriously consider transferring to the Special Security Center, DC, wherein is housed the TEC/CIA, responsibility for security of the "T" areas at KK, necessary clearance of KK personnel, providing courier support to move the project from KK, etc.

d. Although I recognize that this proposal may well evoke cries of anguish from CIA/TEC and CIA/TEO (due to its requiring additional "T" billets and the assumption by the CIA/TEO of the plethora of security problems incidental to monitoring KK and the movement out of processed files), I still believe it should be seriously considered since

e. there is no question in my mind that the developed film and processed negative is in fact "T" material,

f. taking cognizance of the dynamic growth of the NRO and the plans for moving through KK additional Air Force projects, we could well find OSA, Security, devoting a greater and greater portion of its time in support of non-CIA NRO projects in an area which more logically should be handled by the component of CIA set up to oversee the security of the total NRP (it is within the realm of possibility that our operational participation in many of these current programs could be conceivably curtailed and OSA, Security, could be left heavily participating in the management of a security program in support of strictly Air Force projects),

g. we should take note, too, of the fact that the Air Force Westover Photographic Processing Center is apparently coming more and more into the picture. It is a "T" center. Operationally cleared people there are relatively few. The same type work is being done there that is being done at KK. There will be a constantly increased amount of very close intercourse between KK and Westover,

h. when technicians and other specialists from KK are required to visit EPIC or other "T" areas they would already possess the essential "T" clearance and I suggest more logic would be injected into a situation wherein at the present time they can work with the material at KK (under an operational clearance) but are precluded from access to the same material at EPIC (without going through the process of obtaining another clearance.)

i. I might mention, I believe the [redacted]
falls into the same category as KK with regard to their handling the

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25X1A

25X1A
Page 3

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

product of project A (in this instance I recall vividly that the COMOR considered this problem and recommended that [redacted] be treated as an operational facility similar to EK with security responsibility assigned to OSA, Security. As I recall the rationale behind the COMOR recommendation was to avoid the political problem of getting new "T" billets and also I feel that concern was expressed that many of the technical activities at [redacted] might not qualify if the "T" system clearance standards were applied. (At that time the "T" system required that in order to obtain a waiver of one of the security requirements, it was necessary for [redacted] to refer the case to General Cablell.) Recognizing the nature of material being worked on at [redacted] then I would suggest that the OSA operational security responsibility for the material, could well terminate when we deliver the exposed film to EK for initial processing.

25X1A

6. It is realized that we will still continue to have a number of operational clearances at these sites for developmental, maintenance and operational people but the large number of processors would be operationally debracketed.

7. It is recommended that the Chief, Security Branch, be authorized to pursue this revised concept with the interested elements of the Office of Special Activities, Chairman, COMOR and Chief, Special Security Center, Office of Security.

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Chief, Security Branch
OSA

cc: Director of Security

CONCUR:

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
2AD/OSA

Concur, but wish you to explore first with COMOR Chairman the basic question of adding this many new "T" billets. He is directly responsible to DCI for keeping numbers down.

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